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HB contributor Frank Gerits takes a look at the Wikileaks saga from a Belgian 
standpoint…… 
 
[Thanks to Satirewire] 
“For the past few months, Embassy Brussels has been working to set the stage for a change in 
Belgium’s self-concept as a small, meek country… to a country that can show leadership in 
Europe.” – U.S. Embassy cable, Nov. 24, 2009 
The Belgian minister of foreign affairs Steven Vanackere and professor of international 
politics Rik Coolsaet were quick to declare that the documents did not reveal anything that 
people working in the field did not already know. I tend to disagree. These leaks are important 
not so much for their content, but for what they tell us about the current diplomatic culture 
and the  internal machinery of Trans-Atlantic diplomacy. As John Gaddis asked about 
the  Cold War:  What do we now know? We know now that day to day diplomacy, in style 
and tone, is still very much the same as it was during the early Cold War of the fifties. 
Firstly, for Belgium, like the Netherlands, the documents confirm that there are American 
stocks of nuclear mid-range missiles, something that has been and is still officially denied by 
the Belgian government. Admittedly, this is not a very impressive revelation.  However, the 
same cable teaches us that the 2009 foreign minister’s enthusiasm to step into a German 
disarmament plan was tempered by the civil servants of foreign affairs. It teaches us that 
despite the talk about Trans-Atlantic rifts and gained assertiveness during the Iraq war, small 
countries are still very sensitive to the wishes of American big brother. It further shows that 
continuity is valued more than creative diplomacy and exposes a diplomatic culture in which 
the Belgian foreign affairs administrations have an important voice in shaping foreign policy. 
Secondly, the documents expose an American diplomacy that tries to exploit Belgium’s 
longing for a diplomatic role in the world. The ambassador hinted that putting Guantanamo 
detainees in Belgian prisons would be an inexpensive way to strengthen Belgium’s role on the 
world stage. Belgium’s positive response to this question emphasizes how this idea of 
reputation as an asset in foreign policy is considered to be important despite a growing role of 
Europe and despite the conventional interpretation of Belgian foreign policy as that of a 
merchant nation driven by mainly economic interests. It show that the argument I make in my 
ongoing research on Belgium Cold War diplomacy is still relevant today. Belgium 
focused  on building a reputation as a reliable ‘go between’, not out of a sense of altruism or 
to gain more stability in the international system to sell more goods. It wanted to build a 
reliable reputation to set the agenda in effect gaining a form of power. Driven by an 
interlocking set of ideological, economic and security motives. The cables do not offer a clear 
reading of this, but they indicate as much. 
Thirdly, for all the talk about ‘techno-diplomacy’ the Wikileaks cables show a reality that still 
reflects a very conventional way of working. While mass communication and technology 
certainly had its impact on the way diplomacy is conducted, the easy manner in which 
documents have been smuggled out of Washington D.C., show that foreign offices have  not 
yet fully understood the ramifications of the new tools of mass communication. While a form 
of internet was partially created to prevent important documents from being destroyed, the 
easy methods to copy these documents have made them also very vulnerable for public 
exposure.  We know now that diplomatic culture has not yet adjusted to the new realities of 
the information age. 
We also know now that the new world order is not an important issue between the Atlantic 
Partners. In the leaks there is no talk on how to deal with the new powers of the multipolar 
world, being China, Brazil and India. Topics seem to have changed very little since the fifties. 
The Middle East, Korea and nuclear missiles are still the hot issues of the telegrams.  While it 
has to be noted that this can also be due to the selection by the thief, the previous four 
elements expose a diplomatic machinery which has not changed fundamentally since the end 
of the Cold War. 2011 could well be the year in which diplomats come to terms with the new 
information society ushering in an era of new diplomatic culture. 
From that perspective Wikileaks is interesting not only for the insight it gives in the 
diplomatic culture of the past, but also for the very real effects it will have on the diplomatic 
culture of the future. But for now it seems that the mindset of everyday diplomats has not kept 
up with a rapidly changing reality in which securing information and intellectual property has 
become a dubious issue. Surprisingly enough the debate has not gone beyond the sensational 
and focused on the inability of the diplomatic apparatus to deal with the security challenges of 
the future. In the end however, the final analysis will be the work of the future diplomatic 
historian who will silently thank Wikileaks founder Julian Assange for giving him an 
interesting new source. 
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